We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core …

delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is a range of parameter … values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an … negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very …

delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is a range of parameter … values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an … negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very …

nature of investment, writing a simple fixed-price contract can be valuable under repeated transactions: There is a range of … parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal price contract is written and combined with a … relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and the seller. The key condition is how the investment affects the …

a cost-saving ‘unethical' technology, consumer boycotts, and advocacy NGOs into a standard property-rights model of the … international organization of production. Contracts are incomplete, limiting a firm's control over both investment and (un …)ethical technology choices of integrated as well as independent suppliers. We identify the unethical outsourcing incentive as a novel …