The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players'...

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

This paper presents a theoretical framework analysing the signalling channel of exchange rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theoretical premise of the model is that interventions...

The aim of this paper is to develop a continuous time exchange rate model that allows for heterogeneity of the agents’ beliefs, in order to explore non-linearities and possible chaotic behaviour. The theoretical model contains an intrinsic non-linearity that gives rise to a jerk differential...

This paper presents a theoretical framework analyzing the signalling channel of exchange rate interventions as an informational trigger. We develop an implicit target zone framework with learning in order to model the signalling channel. The theoretical premise of the model is that interventions...

The aim of this paper is to develop a continuous time exchange rate model that allows for heterogeneity of the agents' beliefs, in order to explore non-linearities and possible chaotic behaviour. The theoretical model contains an intrinsic non-linearity that gives rise to a jerk differential...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals,...