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To Commit or Not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information

Hoffmann, Sönke - 2014

In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051610

The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-Type Crises in the EMU

Fahrholz, Christian - 2013

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094281

On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem

Goertz, Johanna; Maniquet, François - 2021

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316013

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2008

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406304

Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation

Wagener, Andreas - CESifo - 2009

boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013050

Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis

Konrad, Kai A. - CESifo - 2002

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766134

Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem

Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2002

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051494

Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability

Bernergard, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2011

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008872223

Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - CESifo - 2009

constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of … elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403

Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study

Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2014

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455