Showing 1 - 10 of 413
risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668475
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890
risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080006
Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315688
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315697
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315747
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142234
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596586
Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979416