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Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening
Choné, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent - 2021
This paper examines the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316509
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Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases
Linnemer, Laurent - 2008
Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. Most works, however …;D efforts and therefore are both uncertain. I characterize the optimal separating marketing mix (price and advertising) when …), advertising appears to be necessary together with price to signal quality. Equilibrium profits depend on cost but not on quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771800
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Portfolio Sales and Signaling
Bougheas, Spiros - 2017
A common practice of banks has been to pool assets of different qualities and then sell a fraction of the newly created portfolios to investors. We extend the signaling model for single sales of risky assets to portfolio sales. We identify conditions under which signaling at the portfolio level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960474
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Signaling versus Auditing
Bester, Helmut - 2019
We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education à la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898039
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Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening
Krahmer, Daniel - 2014
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054499
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A Signaling Model of University Selection
Anic, Ivan; Bozin, Vladimir; Urosevic, Branko - 2021
We propose a signaling model of student enrollment dynamics based on probabilities of completion of studies, under different rationality assumptions. There are two types of students and two schools. School of graduation serves as a signal of student productivity to prospective employers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315508
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Who Should Pay for Certification?
Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - 2021
-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316064
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Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2021
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251
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Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random
Macho-Stadler, Ines; Pérez-Castrillo, David - 2021
We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317105
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Emotions in Litigation Contests
Baumann, Florian - 2011
This paper introduces the concept of emotions into the standard litigation contest. Positive (negative) emotions emerge when litigants win (lose) at trial and are dependent in particular on the level of defendant fault. Our findings establish that standard results of litigation contests change...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129864