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Combining "Real Effort" with Induced Effort Costs: The Ball-Catching Task
Gaechter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - CESifo - 2015
an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort … provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ballcatching task combines the advantages of real effort with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277184
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Combining 'Real Effort' with Induced Effort Costs : The Ball-Catching Task
Gächter, Simon - 2015
an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort … provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ballcatching task combines the advantages of real effort with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022498
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Hidden Benefits of Reward : A Field Experiment on Motivation and Monetary Incentives
Kvaloy, Ola - 2013
We conduct a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075962
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CEO Compensation
Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316120
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CEO Compensation
Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - CESifo - 2010
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799732
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
Dur, Robert - CESifo - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181512
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The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Teams Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment
Englmaier, Florian - 2018
influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921301
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Leveraging Wage Subsidies to Facilitate Fair Wages and Increase Social Welfare
Blumkin, Tomer - 2017
productivity than achieved by providing the equivalent direct subsidy. A controlled laboratory experiment supports our behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949108
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Promotion Rat Race and Public Policy
Bjertnaes, Geir - CESifo - 2012
This study investigates whether excess effort to climb a career ladder justifies policy interventions. The answer depends on whether the government is able to levy a higher tax burden on career workers than on non-career workers. Both a tax on top income aimed at lowering the rewards of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540727
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - CESifo - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889984