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Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting against the Party Line?
Kauder, Bjoern - 2017
positions. The dataset includes the voting behavior of 257 MPs in 218 roll-call votes. Our results do not show that parties … account for the voting behavior by punishing politicians who have voted against the party line. Political parties may attract … different groups of voters by tolerating politicians who vote according to their own credo. Qualities other than the voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953695
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Voting in the European Union - Central Europe's Lost Voice
Schneider, Ondrej - 2008
the EU policies has nevertheless been limited. This is due not only to the arcane voting rules within the EU, but also to …, they have to coordinate their voting and become a more coherent voting group than they are now …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768535
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Politics and IMF Conditionality
Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - CESifo - 2013
Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877803
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Altruistic Punishment in Elections
Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas - CESifo - 2014
understanding of this form of costly punishment to help explain a puzzle of voting behavior: why do people who are indifferent … between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a … simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888449
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Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey
Schnellenbach, Jan; Schubert, Christian - CESifo - 2014
Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That’s what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948848
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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784
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Democratic Participation and the Size of Regions: An Empirical Study Using Data on German Counties
Seitz, Helmut - CESifo - 2008
The paper examines the relation between political participation and the size of regions taking German counties as observational units. The paper makes several contributions to the literature. To begin with, we measure political participation along two dimensions namely voter turnout, which is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249471
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Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group
Noussair, Charles; Tan, Fangfang - CESifo - 2009
productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013941
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Lexicographic Voting
Klingelhöfer, Jan - CESifo - 2012
ideological policy dimension. Voters achieve this outcome by following a simple lexicographic voting strategy. They cast their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539147
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How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2012
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010544187