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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435
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Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
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Core-Stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
Biran, Omer - 2010
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142501
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation
Forges, Françoise - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
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Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study
Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2014
We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455
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Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Dittrich, Marcus; Knabe, Andreas; Leipold, Kristina - CESifo - 2011
We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294100
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Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters
D'Exelle, Ben; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2010
generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in the field. We find that networks of different dimensions differ … substantially in density, clustering, and centrality. When relating generosity to networks we observe that social distance only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833916
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Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2006
frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406364
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457
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Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014
According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324