Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 422
Cover Image
Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2013
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper” securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882
Cover Image
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment When the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059473
Cover Image
Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2014
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. "Steeper" securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
Cover Image
Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
Cover Image
An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - CESifo - 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877664
Cover Image
Optimal Cost Overruns : Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian - 2016
Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993698
Cover Image
Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation
Cai, Xiaoming - 2016
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988409
Cover Image
Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-Doing
Barbosa, Klenio; Boyer, Pierre - 2021
Discriminatory programs that favor local and small firms in government procurement are common in many countries. This … paper studies the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries … where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more efficient over time. We consider a sequential procurement design problem …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315854
Cover Image
'Buy-it-Now' or 'Sell-it-Now' Auctions : Effects of Changing Bargaining Power in Sequential Trading Mechanisms
Grebe, Tim - 2016
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000430
Cover Image
A Market Mechanism for Sustainable and Efficient Resource Use Under Uncertainty
Quaas, Martin F. - 2017
Sustainability and efficiency are potentially conflicting social objectives in natural resource management. We propose a market mechanism to allocate use rights over a stochastic resource to private managers. The mechanism endogenously determines the maximal tenure length guaranteeing that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951836