Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 79
Cover Image
The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-driven Aid less Effective?
Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - CESifo - 2010
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572559
Cover Image
Geopolitics, Aid and Growth
Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, Vera; Gehring, Kai - CESifo - 2013
We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries’ political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects or affect the way aid is spent in other ways, reduce the aid bureaucracy’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671571
Cover Image
Public Goods Provision with Rent-Extracting Administrators
Cagala, Tobias - 2018
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927572
Cover Image
Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis
Dreher, Axel; Schneider, Friedrich - CESifo - 2006
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption … that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. We … also find that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406312
Cover Image
Constitutional Determinants of Government Spending
Tabellini, Guido - CESifo - 2000
corruption, the features of electoral cycles. The paper discusses both theory and evidence, and concludes with some speculations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406326
Cover Image
Self-Serving Dictators and Economic Growth
Haile, Daniel; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Verbon, Harrie A. A - CESifo - 2003
A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth. We present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view. We model an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406372
Cover Image
Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?
Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - CESifo - 2009
in US states may indeed reduce corruption levels among elected representatives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403
Cover Image
One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats
Lessmann, Christian; Markwardt, Gunther - CESifo - 2009
The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially …-country data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979408
Cover Image
Demographic Transition and Political Stability: Does Corruption Matter?
Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza; Witthuhn, Stefan - CESifo - 2014
hypothesize that corruption matters in this nexus. Using panel data covering the period of 2002–2012 for more than 150 countries … total working age population (15-64 years old) and corruption on political stability. This finding is robust, controlling … between corruption and the youth population remains robust when we control for the persistency of political stability and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103400
Cover Image
How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption
Bujko, Matthias; Fischer, Christian; Krieger, Tim; … - CESifo - 2015
Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption …-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that … corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011155383