(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another …

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history …. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for …

– that an intransparent negotiation yields a higher buyer surplus than a transparent auction for a range of parameters. In …

different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum … bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction …

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price …

called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a … laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second …-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the 'chopstick …

In this paper we test the AK model of growth with laboratory experiments. In each period, agents produce and trade …