Showing 1 - 10 of 258
In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315597
This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors' choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a “delegation-scheme.” Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073609
' consists of unverifiable information and the quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928248
As the Internet economy has grown, so too has the need for trust. A degree of trust is a critical ingredient in virtually all economic relationships, Internet or otherwise. Every day we choose to trust plumbers, doctors, employers, employees, teachers, airlines, and others. The need for trust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316582
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917514
In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316507
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152