.S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing …While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political … preferences that guide such antitrust prosecutions remain understudied. We empirically examine the intertemporal shifts in U …

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … markets. We also consider policy implications of our analysis regarding an antitrust authority's investment decision in cartel … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel …

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical … markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency … programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is …

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

In this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international … density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the emergence of an …

evidence on punishment preferences, in which subjects reveal a heterogeneous preference for punishing wrongdoers, our model … identifies circumstances in which “punitive” individuals (with stronger-than-average punishment preferences) will self …-select into law enforcement jobs that offer the opportunity to punish (or facilitate the punishment of) wrongdoers. Such “punitive …

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs …. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not …

double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in … attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal … subcultures, zero-tolerance reduces crime across the board …