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Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines

Hicken, Allen; Leider, Stephen G.; Ravanilla, Nico; … - CESifo - 2014

-vote-selling intervention in the Philippines. We model selling one’s vote as a temptation good: it creates positive utility for the future self … at the moment of voting, but not for past selves who anticipate the vote-sale. We also allow keeping or breaking promises … regarding vote-selling to affect utility. Voters who are at least partially sophisticated about their vote-selling temptation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781543

The Political Economy of Sin Taxes

Haavio, Markus; Kotakorpi, Kaisa - CESifo - 2009

We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979413

The Individual and Joint Performance of Economic Preferences, Personality, and Self-Control in Predicting Criminal Behavior

Friehe, Tim; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah - CESifo - 2014

We explore the individual and joint explanatory power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for criminal behavior. More precisely, we consider risk and time preferences, personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739345

Interpreting Time Horizon Effects in Inter-Temporal Choice

Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe - CESifo - 2012

We compare different designs that have been used to test for an impact of time horizon on discounting, using real incentives and two representative data sets. With the most commonly used type of design we replicate the typical finding of declining (hyperbolic) discounting, but with other designs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651859

Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Myrseth, Kristian … - CESifo - 2013

We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation. This means that there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639421

Health Club Attendance, Expectations and Self-control

Garin, Jean-Denis; Masse, Alix; Michaud, Pierre-Carl - CESifo - 2014

Using a unique dataset on health club attendance from Quebec, we look at the relationship between actual and expected attendance and how these relate to a reported measure of self-control problems at the time of contract signing. We find that a large majority of contract choices appear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877917

Self Control and Intertemporal Choice: Evidence from Glucose and Depletion Interventions

Kuhn, Michael A.; Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire - CESifo - 2014

is an increase in subjects’ attention to the decision, rather than their ability to resist the temptation to get money …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877990

Optimal Redistributive Pensions and the Cost of Self-Control

St-Amant, Pier-André Bouchard; Garon, Jean-Denis - CESifo - 2014

individuals’ welfare by altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888451

Knowledge is Power - A Theory of Information, Income, and Welfare Spending

Lind, Jo Thori; Rohner, Dominic - CESifo - 2011

informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of …. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324089

Private, Social and Self-Insurance for Long-Term Care in the Presence of Family Help - A Political Economy Analysis

Donder, Philippe De; Pestieau, Pierre - CESifo - 2013

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693474