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Passarelli, Francesco - 2013

This paper formulates a general theory of how political unrest influences public policy. Political unrest is motivated by emotions. Individuals engage in protests if they are aggrieved and feel that they have been treated unfairly. This reaction is predictable because individuals have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084007

Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?

Redoano, Michela - CESifo - 2007

reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the … measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and, (ii) their impact on policy … offset their influence on policy; however it is possible that the threat of lobbying may affect policy even when no lobby …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094232

International Competition for R&D Investments (new title: Spillovers and international competition for investments)

Olsen, Trond; Osmundsen, Petter - CESifo - 2000

Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare by these spillovers (should they materialize), by tax payments and by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094383

Federal Tax-Transfer Policy and Intergovernmental Pre-Commitment

Köthenbürger, Marko - CESifo - 2007

Federal and state governments often differ in the capacity to pre-commit to expenditure and tax policy. Whether the implied sequence of public decisions has any efficiency implications is the subject of this paper. We resort to a setting which contrary to most of the literature does not exhibit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181305

Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership

Olsen, Trond; Osmundsen, Petter - CESifo - 2000

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181386

Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno Maria - CESifo - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181389

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars - CESifo - 2001

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal’s...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196226

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - CESifo - 2007

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406384

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars - CESifo - 2001

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle – what we term the“delegation principle” – can be used to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406408

Liberation Technology : Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa

Manacorda, Marco - 2016

Can digital information and communication technology (ICT) foster mass political mobilization? We use a novel geo-referenced dataset for the entire African continent between 1998 and 2012 on the coverage of mobile phone signal together with georeferenced data from multiple sources on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988970