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We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089156
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059473
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599726
time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate … that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052093
We investigate the relation between Net Neutrality regulation and Internet fragmentation. We model a two-sided market, where Content Providers (CPs) and consumers interact through Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and CPs sell consumers' attention to advertisers. Under Net Neutrality, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017710
time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate … that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877888