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Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin; Smith, Alec - CESifo - 2015

Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205372

Pro Bono Work and Trust in Expert Fields

Ong, David; Yang, Chun-Lei - CESifo - 2014

A controversy has been simmering in law for at least 30 years about whether pro bono work should be mandatory for lawyers, who now donate 1-3% of their time to the poor. This has centered on the unmet legal needs of the poor, the duty of lawyers, and the contrast with US doctors, who are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877904

Partnership, Gender Roles and the Well-Being Cost of Unemployment

Knabe, Andreas; Schöb, Ronnie; Weimann, Joachim - CESifo - 2012

cognitive, but not on affective well-being, which we interpret as a loss in identity utility. Living in a partnership …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877791

Gift-Giving, Quasi-Credit and Reciprocity

Thomas, Jonathan P.; Worrall, Tim - CESifo - 2002

general reciprocity where the counter obligation is expected but not certain and balanced reciprocity where there is a firm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405716

Endogenous Wage Rigidity

Agell, Jonas; Bennmarker, Helge - CESifo - 2003

wage rigidity can be traced to behavioral mechanisms involving negative reciprocity, relative wage comparisons and money …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406061

Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus - CESifo - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406114

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - CESifo - 2007

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406384

Does Instrumental Reciprocity Crowd out Prosocial Behavior?

Johnsen, Åshild A.; Kvaløy, Ola - CESifo - 2014

experimentally investigate the relationship between intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity by running a two-period repeated trust … do not know and hence the second period comes as a surprise. We find that subjects anticipate instrumental reciprocity …, and that intrinsic reciprocity is rewarded. In fact, the total level of cooperation, in which trust is reciprocated, is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082823

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457

Reciprocity in Organisations - Evidence from the WERS

Englmaier, Florian; Kolaska, Thomas; Leider, Stephen G. - CESifo - 2015

about personality traits of employees, in particular whether these employees are inclined towards reciprocity. Using the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122678