We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, in which trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a...

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

This paper experimentally examines the selection of equilibria in dynamic games. Our baseline treatment is a two-state extension of an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which we modify in series of treatments to study the focality of efficiency and symmetry, the effect dynamic and static...

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...

The paper presents an adjusted Faustmann Rule for optimal harvest of a forest when there is a social cost of carbon emissions. The theoretical framework takes account of the dynamics and interactions of forests’ multiple carbon pools and assumes an infinite time horizon. Our paper provides a...

The paper presents an adjusted Faustmann Rule for optimal harvest of a forest when there is a social cost of carbon emissions. The theoretical framework takes account of the dynamics and interactions of forests’ multiple carbon pools and assumes an infinite time horizon. Our paper provides a...

We consider a two small open economies model with cross-border pollution that is generated from consumption. Within this framework we examine i) the non-cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes and compare them to when pollution is only local, ii) the cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes...

We study the welfare effects of a revenue-neutral green tax reform in a federation. The reform consists of increasing a tax on a polluting input and reducing that on labor income. Households are fully mobile within the federation. Regions are unequally endowed with a nonrenewable natural...