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Federal fiscal arrangements are argued to give rise to tacit collusion among competing Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax, CUP, 1980). Though frequently encountered in academic and policy discussions, the cartelization hypothesis has rarely been scrutinized formally. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406161
A country’s form of government has important economic and political consequences, but the determinants that lead countries to choose either parliamentary or presidential systems are largely unexplored. This paper studies this choice by analyzing the factors that make countries switch from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583718
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772555
The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially depends on the effectiveness of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316367
influence, let alone contest, a national referendum on a new constitution because, if they didn‘t like the result, they would …-sourced constitution bill from 2009 to 2014, and also offers an explanation as to why the bill failed to be passed by Parliament …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960641
assignment of powers between the two main levels of government. More precisely, under current constitutional arrangements, this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766218
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 and onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405877
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of individuals. Hence, we depart from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406042
's constitution. Using historical data dating back to the 19th century and applying a difference-in-difference approach we find that … instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on changing the constitution. This and other tests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989524
This paper reviews aspects of the constitution making process in Iceland after the financial collapse of 2008 …, emphasizing the differences between the provisional constitution of 1944 when Iceland separated unilaterally from Nazi …-occupied Denmark and Denmark's 1849 constitution which served, with notable exceptions, as the prototype for Iceland's 1944 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953950