authorities across regions upon arrival, we find that immigration significantly increases crime. The crime impact of immigration … substantially stronger effects in regions with high preexisting crime levels or large shares of foreigners …

authorities across regions upon arrival, we find that immigration significantly increases crime. The crime impact of immigration … substantially stronger effects in regions with high preexisting crime levels or large shares of foreigners. …

We provide evidence for a beneficial welfare impact of a crime policy that is targeted at strengthening victim …

Empirical evidence reveals that unemployment tends to increase property crime but that it has no effect on violent … crime. To explain these facts, we examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that there is a substitution effect between … property crime and violent crime at work. In the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus …

double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in … attractive for some people who would otherwise commit more severe crime. If social status is sufficiently important in criminal … subcultures, zero-tolerance reduces crime across the board …

We provide evidence about voters' response to crime control policies. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the … were more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals; ii) voters held worse beliefs on the incumbent … governments ability to control crime and iii) with respect to the previous elections, the incumbent national government …

particular, our estimates suggest that - in an average municipality – an additional crime by pardoned individuals led to a drop … also provide evidence of newspapers being more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals and of voters … holding worse beliefs on the incumbent national government's ability to control crime. Our findings indicate that voters keep …

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …