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Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening

Krahmer, Daniel - 2014

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054499

Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games

Vives, Xavier - 2016

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600

Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2021

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251

Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation

Fraisse, Henri - 2021

This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316203

Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy Joseph - 2015

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494

On the Optimal Use of Correlated Information in Contractual Design Under Limited Liability

Danau, Daniel - 2018

Riordan and Sappington (JET, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent's type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917515

Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms

Britz, Volker - 2016

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994342

Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release

Schweizer, Nikolaus - 2015

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014354

Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2021

Information about the future may be instrumentally useful, yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate due to anticipatory feelings. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315497

Signaling to Experts

Kurlat, Pablo D. - 2017

We study competitive equilibrium in a signaling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic … Spence (1973) model of job market signaling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in …. In equilibrium, some high type workers forgo signaling and are hired by better informed firms, who make positive profits …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946849