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Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2021
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251
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Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation
Fraisse, Henri - 2021
This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316203
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Who Should Pay for Certification?
Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - 2021
-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316064
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Information Asymmetry, Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans
Hornig, Stephan O.; Rottmann, Horst; Wapler, Rüdiger - 2021
whether the signalling value differs between the migrants and non-migrants in the German labour market. Starting from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316355
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Signaling to Experts
Kurlat, Pablo D. - 2017
We study competitive equilibrium in a signaling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic … Spence (1973) model of job market signaling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in …. In equilibrium, some high type workers forgo signaling and are hired by better informed firms, who make positive profits …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946849
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Welfare Stigma in the Lab : Evidence of Social Signaling
Friedrichsen, Jana - 2017
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952402
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When Labor Disputes Bring Cities to a Standstill : The Impact of Public Transit Strikes on Traffic, Accidents, Air Pollution, and Health
Bauernschuster, Stefan - 2015
Many governments have banned strikes in public transportation. Whether this can be justified depends on whether strikes endanger public safety or health. We use time-series and cross-sectional variation in powerful registry data to quantify the effects of public transit strikes on urban...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023186
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Long Persuasion Games
Koessler, Frédéric - 2007
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
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Asymmetric Discouragement in Asymmetric Contests
March, Christoph - 2016
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979585
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Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
Vives, Xavier - 2016
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600