Sovereign defaults are bad news for investors and debtor countries, in particular if a default becomes messy and protracted. Why are some debt crises resolved quickly, in a matter of months, while others take many years to settle? This paper studies the duration of sovereign debt crises based on...

This paper studies sovereign debt relief in a long-term perspective. We quantify the relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1920-1939, focusing on the defaults on official (government to government) debt in advanced economies after World War I; and 1978-2010,...

Why do advanced economies fall into prolonged periods of economic stagnation, particularly in the aftermath of credit booms? We present a model of persistent aggregate demand shortage based on strong liquidity preferences of households, in which we incorporate financial imperfections to study...

Using state-dependent local projection methods and historical U.S. data, we find that government spending multipliers are considerably larger in periods of private debt overhang. In particular, we find significant crowding-out of personal consumption and investment in low-debt states, resulting...

We offer a new methodology for the assessment of public debt sustainability in a stochastic economy when sovereign default taken into account. The default threshold differs from the no-Ponzi condition and depends on the post-default debt recovery rule. We distinguish sustainability and...

To make the no-bailout clause credible and enhance the effectiveness of crisis assistance, a consistent institutional and legal framework is needed to ensure that private creditors contribute to crisis resolution. Getting activated as part of ESM crisis assistance, we propose a two-stage...

For centuries, defaulting governments were immune from legal action by foreign creditors. This paper shows that this is no longer the case. Building a dataset covering four decades, we find that creditor lawsuits have become an increasingly common feature of sovereign debt markets. The legal...

In this paper we analyse debt stabilization in a monetary union that features endogenous risk premia. In particular, we analyse debt stabilization in two diametrically opposed regimes. In the first regime, the “national fiscal discipline regime”, financial markets impose sovereign risk...

The objective of this paper is to assess whether external debt makes a difference for public debt stabilization, where external debt is considered through the non-residents' holdings according to a Balance of Payments perspective. The analysis is empirical and considers the case of Italy, one of...

We build a tractable stylized model of external sovereign debt and endogenous international interest rates. In corrupt economies with rent-seeking groups stealing public resources, a politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by permanent fiscal impatience which leads to excessive issuing of...