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acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability … an additional reason to those in the classic principal-agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316254
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445
that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945057
underlying payoffs are identical. However, loss aversion also predicts that workers will demand higher wages to accept penalty … find evidence for the predicted distaste for penalty contracts. In four experiments penalty framing actually increased the … job offer acceptance rate relative to bonus framing. I rule out a number of explanations, most notably self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962112
We study optimal security design when the issuer and market participants agree to disagree about the characteristics of the asset to be securitized. We show that pooling assets can be optimal because it mitigates the effects of disagreement between issuer and investors, whereas tranching a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921214
Several frictions restrict the government’s ability to tax assets. First, it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets. Second, agents can resort to nonobservable low-return assets such as cash, gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too high....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103398
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764295
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550
We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes depending on whether and how the price of the incumbent good is linked to the quantity purchased from the rival...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795341
We adapt the exclusion model of Choné and Linnemer (2014) to reflect the notion that dominant firms are unavoidable trading partners. In particular, we introduce the share of the buyer’s demand that can be addressed by the rival as a new dimension of uncertainty. Nonlinear price-quantity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795345