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their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk … higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928248
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979585
' consists of unverifiable information and the quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612
extreme case of a pure coordination game, subjects still use their private signals, preventing full coordination … welfare if coordination is socially desirable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600
We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316183
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152
We experimentally study decision-making in a novel dynamic coordination game. The game captures features of a … network has higher payoffs, but the transition is slow and costly. Coordination is required to implement the transition while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009866
equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the … voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed …, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316272