Showing 1 - 10 of 604
simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315578
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095928
voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed … equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the …, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316272
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134512
punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075136
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763994
When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley's aggregative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051271
predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315800
We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method' and a within-subjects design, using the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916525
We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072503