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Government Guarantees and Bank Risk Taking Incentives

Fischer, Markus - 2014

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055384

Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products

Galeotti, Andrea; Gonzales, José Luis Moraga - CESifo - 2008

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181272

Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries

Jullien, Bruno - CESifo - 2004

The object of this paper is to discuss on-line intermediation from the perspective of two-sided markets. It builds a … simple model of the intermediation activity when trading partners are involved in a commercial relationship and uses it to … part concentrates on a monopoly intermediation service and discusses both efficient pricing and monopoly pricing. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181364

Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated Products

Galeotti, Andrea - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772229

Marketmaking Middlemen

Gautier, Pieter - 2016

This paper develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode …. We consider two representative business modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets: one is a … other. In our model, buyers and sellers can simultaneously search in an outside market and use the intermediation service …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982510

Labor Market Equilibrium with Public Employment Agency

Holzner, Christian; Watanabe, Makoto - CESifo - 2015

We develop and empirically test a labor market model with Public Employment Agencies (PEA) in order to understand why not all vacancies use the costless services provided by the PEA. We show that both the search market and the PEA can be active in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, workers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202960

Inventory Control and Intermediation in Global Supply Chains

Qu, Zhan; Raff, Horst; Schmitt, Nicolas - CESifo - 2015

The paper develops a simple theoretical model of inventory control in global supply chains. It identifies a role for intermediaries in managing inventory, and shows that inserting an intermediary as an additional link in a supply chain is profitable when demand volatility is high. It also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210404

World Market Access of Emerging-Market Firms: The Role of Foreign Ownership and Access to External Finance

Raff, Horst; Trofimenko, Natalia - CESifo - 2013

This paper uses micro-data from the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys 2002-2006 to investigate how foreign ownership and access to external finance affect the likelihood of manufacturers in emerging markets to export and/or import. Applying propensity score matching to control for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681216

Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard

Kwon, Suehyun - 2019

This paper characterizes when the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense of dynamic mechanism design are sufficient. One can easily construct examples of when they are not sufficient. If the current state or the belief is not a sufficient summary statics of the agent's private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901080

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types

Kwon, Suehyun - 2017

This paper studies a contracting problem where agents' cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947518