Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963378
The path breaking work of Card and Krueger (1993), showing higher minimum wage can increase employment turned the age-old conventional wisdom on its head. This paper demonstrates that this apparently paradoxical result is perfectly plausible in a competitive general equilibrium production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835193
Theoretical discussion on compensating mechanisms involving the Pareto criterion that address inequality rather than absolute welfare is non-existent in trade literature. In a simple HOS model we consider tax-transfer policies that keep the pre-trade degree of inequality unchanged between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954364
The well known Pareto criterion used in the context of efficiency and welfare has to do with absolute changes whereas in every domain of economic behaviour inequality or relative changes has become a major concern. We propose an inequality-preserving or distribution neutral Pareto criterion-the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958456
Credit rationing in the presence of asset inequality affects production and trade pattern in this paper, but not in the conventional way. A Ricardian general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous levels of asset ownership is developed to show that more equal asset distribution may contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962668
With the ensuing immigration reform in the US, the paper shows that targeted skilled immigration into the R&D sector that helps low-skilled labor is conducive for controlling inequality and raising wage. Skilled talent-led innovation could have spillover benefits for the unskilled sector while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914679
This paper introduces "harassment" in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181405