Showing 1 - 10 of 174
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046588
non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868
members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between … coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition … group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087729
International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315816
distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134512
I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098647
This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105142
, inequality aversion and sequential voting effects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085748
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086051