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The Rise of NGO Activism
Daubanes, Julien - 2016
understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to … undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On the one hand, public regulation is vulnerable to the influence of the … industry, and may approve the project even though it is harmful. On the other hand, an NGO may oppose the project. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989525
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Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-The-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes
Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian - 2009
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155667
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Acting Autonomously or Mimicking the State and Peers? A Panel Tobit Analysis of Financial Dependence and Aid Allocation by Swiss NGOs
Dreher, Axel - 2013
NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and … NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for Swiss NGOs. The analysis offers new insights in two major regards: First … countries. Second, by classifying each NGO according to its financing structure, we address the unresolved question of whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012753135
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On the Political Economy of Complexity
Nitzan, Shmuel; Procaccia, Uriel; Tzur, Joseph - CESifo - 2013
Article underscores the dark side of both phenomena by focusing on the anti-competitive features of regulation and reform and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877637
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Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable
Schelker, Mark - CESifo - 2011
Divided government is not only the outcome of moderate voters’ electoral decision to balance party ideology in government, but a more general reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term limited executives (i.e., “lame ducks”) cannot be held accountable due...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221553
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Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence
Bracco, Emanuele; Lockwood, Benjamin; Porcelli, Francesco; … - CESifo - 2015
This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167132
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Incumbent Effects and Partisan Alignment in Local Elections: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis Using Italian Data
Bracco, Emanuele; Porcelli, Francesco; Redoano, Michela - CESifo - 2013
This paper provides a simple model to explain effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on policy choices and election outcomes. We derive precise predictions that, as long as voters attribute most of the credit for providing public goods to the local government: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603855
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Immunity
Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki - CESifo - 2013
Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877744
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Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy
Bracco, Emanuele; Porcelli, Francesco; Redoano, Michela - CESifo - 2013
This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877811
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Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability
Dragu, Tiberiu; Polborn, Mattias - CESifo - 2009
How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the … connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596575