, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because … nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion …

, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …-monetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion. …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent’s take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis … of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal.We determine and characterize the properties …