externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another …An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect …

– that an intransparent negotiation yields a higher buyer surplus than a transparent auction for a range of parameters. In …

different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum … bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction …

deeper and more accurately these two findings by taking Italy as a case study. Our results question the so-called auction …

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price …

ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model the decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of …