Showing 1 - 10 of 216
We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316183
We experimentally study decision-making in a novel dynamic coordination game. The game captures features of a … network has higher payoffs, but the transition is slow and costly. Coordination is required to implement the transition while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009866
private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013049219
equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the … voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot experiment, we find that coordination often fails and exogenously imposed …, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316272
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
We provide new experimental evidence which suggests an asymmetric discouragement effect in lottery contests with heterogeneous abilities. Compared to a symmetric contest, subjects invest less effort when facing a stronger opponent, but they invest the same when facing a weaker opponent. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979585
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600
In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051610
higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928248
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012753233