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Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316052
In fiscal interaction, a policy is evolutionarily stable if, once adopted by all governments, jurisdictions that deviate from it fare worse than those that stick to it. Evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept for models of imitative learning (policy mimicking). We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995187
We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086605
their own risk preferences. The observed allocations are consistent with four different views of justice under uncertainty …An important element for the public support of policies is their perceived justice. At the same time most policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315740
The paper reexamines the welfare economics of intergenerational risk. Risk and its resolution over time are modeled as … preferences to (i) disentangle aversion to intergenerational inequality from aversion to risk, (ii) exhibit a preference for early … resolution of risk, (iii) show different discounting formulas depending on the magnitude of risk and on the timing of its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030316
I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098647
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963772
The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes her fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players' resources are quot;use it or lose itquot; in the sense that any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770491
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the “discouragement effect.” Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649