. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

We provide an explanation for a frequently observed vertical restraint in ecommerce, namely that brand manufacturers …-quality product and limits the wholesale price a brand manufacturer can charge. If, however, the branded product is not available … price is salient in the store, this aligns the retailer's incentives with the brand manufacturer's interest to make quality …

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members …

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement … typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures … proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the …

We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the … importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both … players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader …