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We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996205
While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012564
. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926563
This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160219
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144908
We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987391
We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908792
I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement … typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures … proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315994
oligopoly competition and identify the shape and magnitude of the feedback loop between TV viewers and advertisers. We also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955187
When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494