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This paper provides a model that can account for the almost uniform staggering of wage contracts in some countries as well as for the markedly nonuniform staggering in others. In the model, short and long contracts as well as long contracts concluded in different periods are strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094545
This paper characterizes efficient labor-market allocations in a labor selection model. The model's crucial aspect is cross-sectional heterogeneity for new job contacts, which leads to an endogenous selection threshold for new hires. With cross-sectional dispersion calibrated to microeconomic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017376
There is strong empirical evidence for Cobb-Douglas matching functions. We show in this paper that this widely found relation between matches on the one hand and unemployment and vacancies on the other hand can be the result of different underlying mechanisms. Obviously, it can be generated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988302
We analyze the optimal contract in static moral hazard situations, where the agent's effort is not verifiable. We first present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. We cover the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when the agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993024
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315747
There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence when making contracting decisions, employers should take into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118359
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087744
As predicted by loss aversion, numerous studies find that penalties elicit greater effort than bonuses, even when the underlying payoffs are identical. However, loss aversion also predicts that workers will demand higher wages to accept penalty contracts. In six experiments I recruited workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962112
We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010674452
create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and … therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers …-efficient separation of workers according to their productivity. We further find that externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057664