Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 791
Cover Image
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Trade : Taxes Versus Caps
Eichner, Thomas - 2014
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046588
Cover Image
Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rudiger - 2021
non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868
Cover Image
The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement - Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations
Dekker, Thijs; Dellink, Rob; Ketterer, Janina - 2021
International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315816
Cover Image
Transparency is Overrated : Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information
Cabrales, Antonio - 2018
We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928248
Cover Image
International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion
Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro; Ulph, Alistair - CESifo - 2014
This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736746
Cover Image
Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests
Mealem, Yosef - 2012
This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105142
Cover Image
Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms : Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games
Engelmann, Dirk - 2017
Optimal voting rules have to be tailored to the underlying distribution of preferences. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals' payoffs if players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958449
Cover Image
The Value of Technology Improvements in Games with Externalities : A Fresh Look at Offsetting Behavior
Hoy, Michael - 2015
How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033346
Cover Image
Reciprocity and Emotions When Reciprocators Know Each Other
Reuben, Ernesto; Van Winden, F. A. A. M. - 2021
This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319064
Cover Image
Teams Punish Less
Auerswald, Heike - 2013
Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075136