Showing 1 - 10 of 2,300
This paper models the strategic interaction between a rating agency, a bank and a bank regulator who lacks information … about bank asset risk. The regulator can either (1) make bank capital requirements contingent on credit ratings; or (2) set … constrain high risk bank investment without simultaneously reducing overall investment volume. However, if collusion between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080503
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316064
We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144362
In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763910
Decisions to donate time or money for charitable purposes are typically seen as make-or-buy decisions, implying that there should be a clear distinction between individuals engaging in one of these two forms of giving and that this distinction should be somehow linked to opportunity costs. But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105136
example of a “delegation-scheme.” Conversely, project aid represents a more “centralized” type of aid. According to the theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073609
This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612
Riordan and Sappington (JET, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent's type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917515
Information about the future may be instrumentally useful, yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate due to anticipatory feelings. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315497
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316020