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Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance
Morath, Florian - 2021
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316020
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Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited
Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2021
on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192
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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - 2021
We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals' cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them - as well as subjects' elicited beliefs - to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316430
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Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Cettolin, Elena - 2011
In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination with conditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested in the behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120907
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One-Sided Private Provision of Public Goods with Implicit Lindahl Pricing
Meier, Volker - 2011
decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131546
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On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
Franke, Jörg - 2013
We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086449
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Public Goods and Public Bads
Buchholz, Wolfgang - 2017
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways: While for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes' and Hartley's (2007) Aggregative Game Approach,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955751
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Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision : The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology
Buchholz, Wolfgang - 2017
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960481
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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott - 2015
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024669
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Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Gächter, Simon - 2014
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people's behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044545