This paper examines the interaction between productivity growth, firms' monopolistic market power, and workers' wage bargaining power. Our study contributes to several strands of literatures. First, we examine a monopolistic framework which accounts for wage bargaining. In addition to the other...

In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games....

This paper presents a study of backward and forward patent citations in patents granted to firms and institutions in the Netherlands by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The study establishes different patterns of patent citation in recent Dutch patents belonging to...

This paper examines the interaction between productivity growth, firms’ monopolistic market power, and workers’ wage bargaining power. Our study contributes to several strands of literatures. First, we examine a monopolistic framework which accounts for wage bargaining. In addition to the...

This article examines the role of the interaction between product market and labor market imperfections in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG). Embedding Dobbelaere and Mairesse's (2009) generalization of Hall's (1990) approach, allowing for the possibility that wages are...

This paper investigates two major issues of the patenting behavior of Belgian firms. Firstly, it studies the probabilistic distribution of the patent citations among several major sectors. Secondly, the firm-oriented data is studied to investigate the relationships between the Belgian firms’...

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation...

We present a model where firms make competitive decisions about the optimal duration (or time to build) of their R&D projects. Choosing its project’s duration, the firm can choose to become a leader or a follower, based on its R&D efficiency, the size of the R&D to be carried out and the...

This paper presents a dynamic model of a competitive R&D and production duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers. Two asymmetric firms operate for a limited period of time and dispose their knowledge capital in the end. Both firms and the social planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over...

We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of...