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Signing Distortions in Optimal Tax and Other Adverse Selection Problems with Random Participation
Jacquet, Laurence - 2012
We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108085
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Information Design in Insurance Markets : Selling Peaches in a Market for Lemons
Garcia, Daniel - 2018
This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924981
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Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - 2013
We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal “menus”of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080006
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Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity
Vives, Xavier - 2021
A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316270
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - 2021
welfare losses is 1/ n2 . The results extend to demand schedule competition and a range of applications in product and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316291
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - 2021
uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition … the collusive level. Furthermore, competition in supply functions aggregates the dispersed information of firms (the … equilibrium is privately revealing) while Cournot competition does not. The implication is that with the former the only source of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316471
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Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs
Dreher, Axel - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors' choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a “delegation-scheme.” Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073609
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Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures : Theory and Evidence
Dreher, Axel - 2013
This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075612
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Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games
Vives, Xavier - 2016
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013008600
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Markets for Information : Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies
Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - 2021
In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316507