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likely to differ in their tolerance for risk. In this paper, I investigate a contracting scheme designed to mitigate the … asymmetric information problem where agents are heterogeneous in their tolerance for risk. Mechanisms that recognize the …' private information about risk tolerance, offer a sensible way to approach the problem. These contracts are generally a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914953
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent's marginal return of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966930
This paper shows that the cost of enforcing contracts governing non-financial relationships between firms affects a firm's financing structure. We analyze the interaction between a firm's capital structure and the type of contracts it uses to deal with its suppliers. We first develop a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950295
nature of investment, writing a simple fixed-price contract can be valuable under repeated transactions: There is a range of … parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal price contract is written and combined with a … relational contract. We also show that there are cases in which not writing a formal contract but entirely relying on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028957
each period. In contrast to previous findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product … values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121866
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect … enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060466
. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927192
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981595
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559