We study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new way of representing the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model. We then embed this static analysis in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely...

This article reviews recent theoretical contributions on digital piracy. It starts by elaborating on the reasons for intellectual property protection, by reporting a few facts about copyright protection, and by examining reasons to become a digital pirate. Next, it provides an exploration of the...

We study an endogenous growth model where a profit-motivated R and D sector coexists with the introduction of free blueprints invented by philanthropists. These goods are priced at marginal cost, contrary to proprietary ones which are produced by a monopoly owned by the inventor. We show that...

We analyze strategic interactions between two competing distributors of an independent TV channel. Consistent with most of the relevant markets, we assume that the distributors set end-user prices while the TV channel sets advertising prices. Within this framework we show that the distributors...

This paper analyzes market segmentation in a two-sided market that consists of media consumers and advertisers. The analysis is motivated by a European Court of Justice Decision in October 2011, which allowed viewers to take advantage of international price differences and buy access to Premier...

Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender's objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker's objective is to destroy a set of...

We study a platform's design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers' competition by charging them transaction fees that increase with sales revenue, and...

We study a dynamic model with two competing durable goods; one dirty, the other clean. Due to network effects a consumer who adopts the dirty good today will increase the incentive future consumers have to adopt the dirty good. Thus, a consumer who chooses the dirty good, in a sense causes more...

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market. The platform provider is uncertain about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. Setting participation fees on both sides, it gradually learns about these externalities by observing...