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oligopoly. We find that in the short run, i.e. when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous, the results concerning tax … exit over-shifting of both taxes is more likely to occur and is more pronounced under upstream oligopoly. As a result of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764392
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Economics Letters, 124: 122-126) show that in a vertically related market Cournot competition yields higher social welfare compared to Bertrand competition if the upstream firm subsidises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965632
We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987391
We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality. Once established, firms compete for market shares, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. The equilibrium of the pricing game exists and is unique within...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315485
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926563
If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot-oligopoly, market entry will be excessive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964693
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772613
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031656
The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318548
This paper explores the impact of product liability on vertical product differentiation when product safety is perfectly observable. In a two-stage competition, duopolistic firms are subject to strict liability and segment the market such that a low-safety product is marketed at a low price to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265259