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Core-Stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer - 2010

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142501

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation

Forges, Françoise - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Trade : Taxes Versus Caps

Eichner, Thomas - 2014

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046588

Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games

Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin - 2021

Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315941

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435

Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2021

distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Dittrich, Marcus - 2011

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120274

Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements : Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?

Bosetti, Valentina - 2015

This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750000

Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rudiger - 2021

non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868