We generalize the refinement ordering for well calibrated probability forecasters to the case were the debtors under consideration are not necessarily identical. This ordering is consistent with many well known skill scores used in practice. We also add an illustration using default predictions...

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they...

We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes — a ‘team' — as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process....

The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction...

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...

We study the impact of diverse beliefs on conduct of monetary policy. We use a New Keynesian Model solved with a quadratic approximation. Aggregation renders the belief distribution an aggregate state variable. Diverse expectations change standard results about a smooth trade-off between...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...

We test the no-trade theorem in a laboratory financial market where subjects can trade an asset whose value is unknown. Subjects receive clues on the asset value and then set a bid and an ask at which they are willing to buy or to sell from the other participants. In treatments with no gains...

We study reputational herding in financial markets in a laboratory experiment. In the spirit of Dasgupta and Prat (2008), career concerns are introduced in a sequential asset market, where wages for investors are set by subjects in the role of employers. Employers can observe investment...