This paper describes a model, implemented in an Excel spreadsheet, for evaluating a wide range of fiscal and regulatory instruments policymakers might consider for implementing their Paris mitigation pledges. Policies are evaluated against a range of metrics, including impacts on carbon dioxide...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We develop a 2-period emission trading model for a stock pollutant with demand shocks resolving over time. We find precise conditions for efficiency of a stabilization mechanism where cumulative available permits decrease with excess supply in early periods. Our model describes the stabilization...

We study optimal climate policy for a "policy bloc" of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy “fringe” of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms' past...

This paper provides a formal survey of price and quantity instruments for mitigating global warming. We explicitly consider policies' impact on the incentives of resource owners who maximize their profits intertemporally. We focus on the informational and commitment requirements of the...

If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to...

The efficiency effects of carbon pricing depend on how it impacts distortions in fossil fuel markets, most notably from local air pollution externalities. By offsetting these distortions, carbon pricing may generate significant net economic benefits, so it is in countries own interests to...

This paper calculates, for the top twenty emitting countries, how much pricing of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions is in their own national interests due to domestic co-benefits. On average, nationally efficient prices are substantial, $57.5 per ton of CO₂ (for year 2010), reflecting primarily...

We study adaptation to climate change in a federalist setting. To protect themselves against an increase in flood risk, regional governments choose among adaptation measures that vary with respect to their costs, the level of protection they offer, and the presence and nature of spillovers to...

The texts of the COP 21 Decision and its Annex are scrutinized from the particular point of view of the extent to which economic theoretic concepts can be considered to inspire them. While this is shown to be partially the case in some of the intentions, the texts themselves contain more...