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Complex Tax Incentives - An Experimental Investigation

Abeler, Johannes; Jäger, Simon - CESifo - 2013

How does tax complexity affect people’s reaction to tax changes? To answer this question, we conduct an experiment in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652444

Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics

Slemrod, Joel - CESifo - 2009

It is entirely appropriate that the study of public finance take seriously “behavioral” inconsistencies with traditional models of individual and collective decision-making. This raises the question of whether the state should play a role in protecting individuals from themselves, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572563

Controlling Complexity in Spatial Modelling

Paelinck, Jean - CESifo - 2000

The present complexity approach is based on two assumptions: A1: measurability of deviations of outcomes with respect … to reference values; A2 : extension of A1 to multi-set analysis. Complexity is then defined in terms of multi … reducing greatly the degree of complexity of the problem, and hence the difficulty of finding a solution. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181604

Secrecy Jurisdictions

Schjelderup, Guttorm - CESifo - 2015

This paper surveys tax haven legislation and links the literature on tax havens to the literature on asymmetric information. I argue that the core aim of tax haven legislation is to create private information (secrecy) for the users of tax havens. This leads to moral hazard and transaction costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011200047

Wars of Conquest and Independence

Hodler, Roland; Yektas, Hadi - CESifo - 2013

Wars of conquest and wars of independence are characterized by an asymmetric payoff structure: one party gets aggregate production if it wins, and its own production if it loses, while the other party gets only its own production if it wins, and nothing if it loses. We study a model of war with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668476

Wages and International Tax Competition

Krautheim, Sebastian; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim - CESifo - 2012

Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust empirical finding. If workers bargain with firms, information on the actual surplus is essential. When the firm can use profit shifting to create private information on the surplus, it can thereby reduce its wage bill. We study how rent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555697

When a Price is Enough: Implementation in Optimal Tax Design

Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris - CESifo - 2014

This paper studies the design of tax systems that implement a planner’s second-best allocation in a market economy. An example shows that the widely used Mirrleesian (1976) tax system cannot implement all incentive-compatible allocations. Hammond’s (1979) “principle of taxation” proves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948830

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities

Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2006

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765690

Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance

Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor - CESifo - 2001

Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765906

Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - CESifo - 2004

In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765918