We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the … contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one … where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that …

I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded …. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into … quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the quantity contest. This latter feature implies that the two contests …

I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock … (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if … the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this equilibrium, individual …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of …

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of … in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …

contestants. Focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (deterministic all-pay-auctions and logit … CSFs), we show that an all-pay auction is always the preferred CSF from the point of view of the contest designer. This … result provides a new political-economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature …

conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings where these …