This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

In this paper minimum coloring games are considered. We characterize the type of conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple minimum coloring games. We provide an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques of conflict graphs inducing such games. Moreover, a characterization of the...

In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -- Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order....

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible...